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Money laundering, which is closely linked with tax evasion and informal trade, is facilitated by 
the poorly regulated financial institutions of “mafia nations.”  These nations make billions of 
dollars by laundering money and giving safe haven to drug dealers and corrupt politicians, 
allowing them to transfer money globally.  Money laundering prevention policies require 
financial institutions to periodically update their customer’s personal information.  
Furthermore, they attempt to match tax and transaction reports collected from banks and non-
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banks around the world to detect tax evasion.  This research explains how efficient policies for 
preventing money laundering can help reduce tax evasion. 
 
I. Introduction 
We live in an increasingly globalized economy, which is characterized by innovation 
and technology, market integration and the emergence of new economies.  The opening of 
borders for free trade has introduced a new way of making business.  As the world financial 
systems become more interrelated, the movement of capital between countries is becoming 
more constant, intensive and instantaneous.  Electronic transactions have made trade, finance 
and large investments easier, facilitating the development of international business (da Costa, 
2001).  Nonetheless, the harnessing the tremendous potential of these new changes involves 
important changes, especially in the financial sector. 
 For example, integration and technology facilitates the evasion of taxes by companies, 
the laundering of profits obtained from crime, and corruption (Agarwal and Agarwal, 2004).  
As the later is a constant variable in our society, it makes it very difficult to prevent money 
laundering and fight tax evasion indexes.  Moreover, it is important to consider that even when 
efforts to combat money laundering and tax evasion are being increased, corruption is not 
receding.  This adversely affects the effectiveness of any prevention policy and program. 
 This research explains how efficient policies for preventing money laundering can help 
reduce tax evasion. 
The increasing amounts of corruption is revealed by the following figures which show 
the corruption levels in different countries and regions, as calculated using the International 
Transparency (the only worldwide non-governmental organization dedicated to combating 
corruption) methodology.  The figures reflect the perception of the corruption level according 
to entrepreneurs, academics, and analysts.  The values range from 0 (highly corrupt) to 10 
(highly clean). 
 The remainder of the paper is organized as follows.  Section II provides an overview of 
the main issues discussed in this paper:  corruption, tax evasion, and money laundering.  
Section III discusses the current money laundering legislation in the Unites States of America 
and in Mexico.  Section IV analysis how this legislation can potentially be used to combat tax 
evasion and money laundering.  Section V concludes. 
 
II. An Overview of Corruption, Tax Evasion and Money Laundering 
II.1 Corruption 
Corruption strongly hinders economic development.  It erodes confidence in public 
institutions.  It distorts decisions on macroeconomic, monetary and financial policy, which 
adversely affects public revenues, and discourages private investment.  Moreover, it distorts 
public sector expenditure, damaging the government credibility by eroding confidence from 
both, tax payers and private investors.  Thus, it is evident that corruption obstructs the mission 
of our finance ministers – economic growth and development.  However, unfortunately, they 
have not been traditionally considered as part of the front line to combat corruption. 
 Shleifer and Vishny (1993) show that weak governments that do not control their 
agencies experience very high corruption levels, and that the illegality of corruption and the 
need for secrecy make it much more distortionary and costly than its sister activity, taxation.  
These results may explain why, in some less developed countries, corruption is so high and so 
costly to development (see also Shleifer and Vishny, 1999).  Glaeser, Scheinkman and Shleifer 
(2003) shows that in many countries, the operation of legal, political and regulatory institutions 
is subverted by the wealthy and the politically powerful for their own benefit.  This subversion 
  
59
 
takes the form of corruption, intimidation, and other forms of influence.  They illustrate the 
model they construct with historical evidence from Gilded Age United States and the transition 
economies of the 1990s.  They also present some cross-country evidence consistent with the 
basic prediction of the model (see also, Shleifer, 2004). 
 Goel and Nelson (2005) use an index of corruption, to examine the determinants of 
corruption for a large sample of countries.  Specifically, they investigate whether economic 
freedom or political freedom serves as a deterrent to corrupt activity.  Does greater economic 
freedom or greater political freedom yield a more "clean" society?  They conclude that greater 
economic freedom seems to matter more in this regard.  The authors Examine different 
components of economic freedom and find that not all these components are equally effective 
in reducing corruption.  For example, monetary policy seems to have a stronger influence on 
the level of corrupt activity in a country than fiscal policy.1 
 Corruption is actually instigated by the recent proliferation of non-transparent financial 
procedures, excess regulations, as well as poorly trained or low-paid public officials.  
Furthermore, the lack of competition in the financial sector along with corruption, adversely 
affect the distribution of private capital, facilitating the emergence of money laundering and 
fiscal evasion; this makes the financial system more vulnerable. 
 Thus, this research intends to explain how efficient policies for preventing money 
laundering can help reduce tax evasion. 
For instance, among the Latin American and Caribbean countries, Chile ranks as the 
least corrupt country in the region, while Mexico stands in 64th place.  At the same time, the 
region of Latin American and Caribbean nations is the second most corrupt in the world. 
 
II.2 Tax Evasion 
Tax or fiscal evasion refers to the elimination or diminution of a tax amount produced 
within a country by those who are legally obliged to pay it, and who achieve this goal by means 
of fraudulent activities or with the omission and violation of legal provisions.  For a country to 
meet the collective public needs and its institutional, social, and political aims, it needs 
financial resources.  These resources are obtained through exercising its tax power originating 
from its own sovereignty, from the usufruct of the state’s goods, and through indebtedness from 
public credit.  Therefore, from the point of view of revenue from taxes, the absence of this 
revenue source causes significant fund insufficiency in state coffers which support the basic 
functions of the state.  Hence, tax evasion constitutes a phenomenon that, besides eroding the 
government revenues, deteriorates the social and economic structure of the country, causing an 
inefficient resource allocation system and hurting the government’s legitimacy (see, for 
example, Slemrod, 1998, and Slemrod and Yitzhaki, 2002). 
 Slemrod (2004) offers an economics perspective on tax evasion and abusive avoidance 
done by corporations. The paper reviews what is known about the extent and nature of 
corporate tax noncompliance and the resources devoted to enforcement. It then addresses the 
supply side of aggressive corporate tax planning--the industrial organization of the tax shelter 
industry--as well as the demand for corporate tax evasion and abusive avoidance, focusing on 
how the standard approach to tax evasion needs to be modified when applied to public 
corporations. It then discusses the implications of a supply-and-demand approach for the 
analysis of the incidence and efficiency cost of corporate income taxation, and the very 
justification for a separate tax on corporation income. The paper also addresses policy 
proposals aimed at increased disclosure of corporate tax activities to both the IRS and to the 
public. 
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The obvious way of reducing tax evasion would be to improve supervision of tax 
authorities over institutions and companies, both formal and informal, which generate wealth in 
a country. This supervision must be strict, respecting the principles of tax equality and equity. 
 The significance of tax evasion is illustrated by the recent estimate by the Servicio de 
Administracion Tributaria (SAT, Tax Administration Service, which is a decentralized 
organization in charge of collecting the country’s federal taxes) that tax evasion in Mexico was 
equal to almost 4% of the country’s GDP in 2004, with evasion in Value Added Taxes and 
Income Tax each amounting to 2% of GDP. Consequently, if tax evasion were eliminated tax 
revenues would increase to about 16% of GDP. 
 Tax evasion is significant in Mexico due to the following weaknesses within the 
Mexican tax framework: 
 
1. rates differentiated from VAT with easy arbitrage 
2. special regimes 
3. unnecessary complexity in Income tax calculation 
 
Therefore, tax evasion cannot be reduced through a single policy.  Multiple short and 
long term actions would be required, with the most effective ones being the reduction and 
simplification of administration, and the increase of information about current and potential tax 
payers. 
 In Mexico, for instance, the collection from VAT is only 3.5% of GDP, which is much 
lower than the average of 6.6% in OECD countries and 5.5% in Latin America.  Additionally, 
according to international sources, the informal economy indicator for Mexico ranges 30% to 
50%.  Thus, if the informal trade percentage were to be applied to the 8 million tax payers in 
SHCP ‘s (Ministry of Finance) database, the active tax payers’ SAT database would swell to, at 
least, 10, 400, 000. 
 This significant statistic shows that the Mexican economy would gain tremendously if 
the economic resources from the shadow economy were invested or saved in national financial 
institutions (see in this regard, Choi and Thum, 2005)  Thus, it is imperative that the tax 
authorities in Latin America use the anti-money laundering information generated by the 
financial sector to stop tax evaders. 
 
II.3 Money Laundering 
Money Laundering is defined as the process by which the existence of an illegal source 
or use of income derived from illegal activities is hidden so as to make that income seem 
legitimate.  It is estimated that total money laundering amounts to nearly 2% to 5% of the world 
Gross Domestic Product.1 
Agarwal and Agarwal (2004) study the extensive money laundering in the banking 
sector, claiming that electronic transfers greatly facilitated and magnified the scale of 
international money laundering through banks.  They conclude that the international scale of 
money laundering needs to be assessed by the IMF and World Bank through a more 
comprehensive and integrated approach.  Da Costa (2001) addresses the issue of how small and 
medium-sized companies can use the Internet as a tool for reaching new markets and for 
improving service in the markets where they are players already.  He discusses the growing 
worldwide importance of small companies and provides background on the information 
industry and the Internet economy across national borders.  Da Costa (2001) presents a vision 
of a future in which small companies will have a much larger share of economic activity 
worldwide, and where business and consumers will organize themselves into virtual 
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communities.  Although he does not specifically address the issue of money laundering, it 
seems that the increased use of the internet greatly facilitate such illegal activities. 
De Boyrie and Zdanowicz (2005) study the impact of Switzerland's money laundering 
law on the movement of money through false invoicing in international trade between the US 
and Switzerland during the period 1995-2000.  The study supports the view that individuals and 
companies will find substitute techniques and channels to launder money when central banking 
authorities enact legislation that only focuses on financial institutions. 
Levi (2002) examines the definitions of "money laundering’ and the role its regulation 
plays in dealing with drug markets. He claims that prevention of laundering would reduce 
incentives to become major criminals, as he discusses the laundering techniques used with drug 
money. He also confirms the impact of anti-laundering efforts on enforcement resources, 
organized crime markets, and drug consumption. 
 Masciandaro (2005) theoretically discusses and empirically tests the relationships 
between specific country features, policymaker choices, toward tax financial regulation and 
national non co-operative attitude with respect to the international effort to combat money-
laundering phenomena.  Schneider (2004) examines how the financial proceeds of organized 
criminal activity are laundered through the Canadian real estate market. He believes that real 
estate can be used as a monetary laundering vehicle as a host of mechanisms commonly used 
with real estate transactions can frustrate efforts to unearth the criminal source of funds, such as 
nominees, fake mortgages, solicitor-client privilege, and legal trust accounts.  
 Swamy (2000) presents detailed case studies of money laundering in Russia (focusing 
on capital flight) and in Nigeria (focusing on the collapse of the London-based Johnson 
Matthey Bank) and proves that the exercise of preparing conventional financial statements year 
after year by accountants for companies/organizations is a theoretical exercise in futility. She, 
subsequently, comes out with a new approach to financial statements analysis to fit into real 
business life situations. 
 Money laundering has severe adverse economic consequences for a country such as: 
variations in monetary demand and interest rates, exchange rate volatility.  Moreover, tax 
collection is adversely affected and public resources are misallocated as registration 
information is forged, confidence in financial markets is eroded and the design of public 
policies is distorted.  Moreover, since money laundering has become an international problem, 
organizations such as the UN and OECD have initiated important efforts to combat it. 
For instance, the Grupo de Accion Financiera (GAFI, Financial Action Task Force) was 
established by the G-7 Summit held in Paris in July 1989, with the aim of assessing the 
measures taken to combat money laundering. In 1990, 40 recommendations for combating 
money laundering were issued, and so far, 9 special recommendations have been issued for 
combating terrorism funding (Huizinga, 2002). 
Mexico is one the 33 GAFI members, starting as an observer in 1999 and acquiring full 
status as a member in 2000. 
The 40 recommendations from GAFI are divided into 4 categories: 
 
1. Measures that must be taken by legal systems. 
2. Measures that must be taken by financial institutions and non-financial professions and 
activities to prevent asset laundering and terrorism funding.  
3. Institutional measures in bodies assigned to combating asset laundering and terrorism 
funding.  
4. International co-operation.  
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Similarly, the Grupo de Accion Financiera Internacional  (International Financial 
Action) works with various governments to develop policies to combat money laundering and 
terrorism funding at a national and international scale.  Also, a group of major banks of the 
world has approved a set of guidelines against money laundering, known as Wolfsberg’s 
Principles, to be applied by the international private banks. These new guidelines were jointly 
announced on October 30, 2000 by 11 banks. 
Additionally, there are also some guidelines issued by the Basel committee, formed in 
1975 by the presidents of the central banks of the participating ten countries, to increase co-
operation between banking supervision authorities.  These nations include Belgium, Canada, 
France, Germany, Italy, Japan, Luxemburg, the Netherlands, Sweden, Switzerland, the United 
Kingdom.  
 In April 1997, the committee published Principios Basicos para la Supervision Bancaria 
Efectiva (Basic Principles for Effective banking Supervision), a document outlining 25 
principles which need to be implemented by banking and public authorities in all the countries 
in order to achieve an effective supervision society. The Basel committee members and the 16 
banking supervising agencies that participated in producing this document have already 
implemented these suggestions.  In January 2001, the Basel Committee on Banking 
Supervision also issued a report establishing a program about customer knowledge, the best 
defense a bank can have against launderers and other financial crimes. 
 Taking into account the abovementioned definitions and concepts, we can claim that in 
general, tax evasion involves hiding or disguising legally earned money in order to prevent it 
from being transferred to the Treasury. That is, legal money is made illegal. On the other hand, 
money laundering consists of generating revenue illegally and hiding or disguising them in 
such way that they seem to be legitimate. That is, illegal money is made legal. 
Although both concepts have opposite effects on the legitimacy of money, it has been 
suggested that efficient policies for preventing money laundering can help reduce tax evasion.  
Nonetheless, it is important to first discuss the policies implemented by some countries such as 
the United States and Mexico to combat money laundering. 
 
III. Money Laundering Legislation in the United States and in Mexico 
III.1 Money Laundering Legislation in the United States 
In 1986, the United State enacted Title 19, U.S. Code Sec. 1956, making it the first 
country to pass legislation recognizing money laundering as a crime. Since the law applies to 
much more than just drug trafficking cash proceeds and carries heavy penalties, it is 
extensively used by federal prosecutors. 
 The Figure 1 is a brief description of how this powerful law works and how it relates 
money laundering and tax evasion.  
The events of September 11, 2001 renewed attention towards money laundering 
activities around the world. The USA, in particular, has reinforced its policies to combat money 
laundering. They have made important modifications to the Bank Secrecy Act (BSA) and the 
Money Laundering Laws (MLL) through the Patriot Act, making it world’s most advanced 
legislation in preventing money laundering. The force and international scope of this act makes 
it the most powerful law since the times of Franklin D. Roosevelt.  
 
 The chief aims of these measures were: 
1. Regulating the money transmitters.  
2. Requiring the compliance of some standards by non-financial trade or business, 
including jewelry sellers, real estate agencies, and car, plane and vessel dealers.  
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3. Detecting suspicious operations.  
4. Establishing the minimum guidelines for programs against money laundering.  
5. Detecting the source and/or ownership of the funds coming from illegal activities.  
6. Legally preventing, detecting and processing international money laundering practices, 
as well as terrorism funding.  
7. Regulating both, financial sector and non-economic enterprises, which are susceptible 
to money laundering.  
 
The US law has an extraterritorial reach if the offense is committed by a U.S. citizen or 
by a non-U.S. citizen who conducts at least part of the offense in the U.S. and if the transaction 
involves more than $10,000. In addition to its heavy criminal penalties of up to 20 years in 
prison and $500,000 in fines, the law permits civil penalty lawsuits by the government for the 
value of the funds or property involved in the transaction.  
 
III.2 Money Laundering Legislation in Mexico 
By the decree published in the Official Gazette (DOF, for its acronym in Spanish) on 
December 28, 1989, article 115 BIS to the Fiscal Code of the Federation was added. In it, they 
have typified the behavior of money laundering as a tax nature crime. This was applied from 
1989 to 1996.  On November 17, 1995 modifications were made to the Credit Institution Act, 
the Exchange Act, General Act on Organizations and Auxiliary Credit Activities, General Act 
on Insurance Mutualist Institutions and Corporations, and the Federal Act on Guarantor 
Institutions. These modifications had the aim of enabling the SHCP to dictate general 
provisions for preventing and detecting acts or operations with resources, rights or goods that 
proceeds or represent the product of a likely crime.  
 The article 400 BIS from the Criminal Code was later modified (through a Decree 
published in the DOF on May 13, 1996) in order to define the crime which involves carrying 
out operations with illegal origin resources. This type of crime was formerly considered in 
article 115 BIS from the Fiscal Code of the Federation.  Furthermore, article 180 from the 
Criminal Code and its modification establish the information or document requirements in 
relation to the financial system, formulated by the PGR (Attorney General of the Republic) or 
any other judiciary authority. These policies would be implemented through the National Banks 
Commission (CNBV) and Insurance Commission (CNSF), as may be the case. 
 In the same decree, article 194 from the Federal Code of Criminal Procedures was 
modified in order to establish money laundering as a serious crime. This is provisioned in 
article 400 BIS of the Criminal Code. This qualification does not give the defendant the right, 
during previous investigation or during the process, to be provisionally free under parole.  
Moreover, Article 9 requires that when Federation Attorney investigates activities of members 
from organized crime related to the crime of operations made with illegal origin resources 
(money laundering), they do so in co-ordination with the SHCP (Ministry of Finance).  
Furthermore, in order to prevent any activity related to articles 139 and 400 BIS from the 
Federal Criminal Code, a decree was released on January 28, 2004 in the Official Gazette of the 
Federation regarding the punishments applied to money laundering and terrorism. This decree 
modifies and adds several provisions for several institutions belonging to the financial sector.  
 On May 14, 2004 SHCP released the General Provisions applicable to the following 
Acts: 
  
64
 
 
• Ley de Instituciones de Credito (Credit Institutions Act) 
• Ley de Ahorro y Credito Popular (Popular Credit and Saving Act)  
• Ley de los Sistemas de Ahorro para el Retiro (Saving System for Retirement Act)  
• Ley Federal de Instituciones de Fianzas (Federal Act on Guarantor Instituions)  
• Ley General de Instituciones y Sociedades Mutualists de Seguros (General Act on 
Insurance Mutualist Institutions and Corporations)  
• Ley del Mercado de Valores (Exchange Act)  
• Ley de Sociedades de Inversion (Investment Corporations Act) 
• Ley General de Organizaciones y Actividades Auxiliares del Credito (General Act on 
Credit Auxiliary Organizations and Activities 
 
This would allow all the financial institutions included in the previous acts to strengthen 
their measures and procedures for detecting funds from illegal activities that could be 
introduced into the financial system.  
 The main aspects established by the federal government are the following: 
 
• Financial institutions are compelled to aim to prevent and detect acts regarding money 
laundering.  
• Informing the authorities about any activity or link established with customers classified 
as high-risk. This includes politically exposed people.  
• Establishing a policy for knowing and identifying the customer. 
• Creating a Communication and Control Committee that would analyze every internal 
procedure.  
• Appointing a Compliance Official, who will be in charge in assessing the correct 
functioning of internal procedures.  
• Training the staff of the institution for detecting and preventing illegal origin resources.  
• Systematize the procedures for identifying fragmented operations that are higher than 
the limits established for each institution. 
 
Civil punishments for violating General Provisions amount to almost 100,000 days of 
S.M.G.V. (4.5 million pesos, approximately) and the criminal ones range from five to fifteen 
years of imprisonment and from 1,000 to 5,000 days of fine (SMGV). 
 
IV. Combating tax evasion through money laundering prevention policies 
There are substantial similarities between the techniques used in tax evasion and those 
used in money laundering.  The use of artificial arrangements and offshore financial centers are 
common to both, money laundering and tax evasion.  Therefore, various regulatory systems 
have been designed to facilitate the information between tax and anti-money laundering 
authorities at the national level. Among OECD countries, for instance, there are information 
sharing procedures between tax and anti-money laundering authorities. 
 In May 1998, the G7 Finance Ministers encouraged international actions to enhance the 
capacity of anti-money laundering systems to deal more effectively with tax related crimes, as 
well as to deal with the provision of money laundering information to tax authorities in order to 
support the investigation of tax related crimes such as tax evasion.  Thus, we can assert that 
combating tax evasion involves simplifying processes and making information more timely and 
reliable. Information for money laundering prevention, by law, has to provide the authorities of 
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financial intelligence with the financial agents in Mexico. This information would therefore, 
help fiscal authorities to combat tax evasion. 
 The next few subtopics discuss some fundamental points that are part of a review or an 
audit regarding money laundering prevention and then go on to elaborate how this information 
could be used by fiscal authorities in order to reduce tax evasion indexes.  
 
IV.1 Customer Knowledge and identification. 
Customer knowledge is the core of any effective anti-money laundering program.  It is 
important to differentiate between customer identification, which simply consists of requesting 
information or documentation accrediting the identity of anybody who intends to make any 
financial operation.  Customer knowledge, similarly, consists of conducting a deeper analysis 
of the background, occupation and transactional behavior of the customer, with the aim of 
identifying possible unusual or suspicious operations.  
 With respect to customer identification, Mexican authorities require that financial 
institutions request their customer’s personal information before engaging in any financial 
operations. 
 For instance, for individual customers would be required to submit important 
information such as business activity or field, occupation, CURP (Unique key for Population 
Registration) and RFC (Federal Tax payers’ record). Customers are also required to submit a 
personal ID, CURP document and Fiscal Identification Card to the financial institutions.  
 Similarly, Mexican corporations also have to mention their trade field, date of 
establishment and their RFC. These corporations are also required to submit a testimony or a 
certify copy of the by-laws registered in the Public Registry of Trade, Fiscal Identification Card 
and a document verifying their permanent address.  
 Foreigners wishing to open deal with financial institutions have submit a copy of their 
passport and a legalized copy with apostille of the document verifying their legal existence. 
Correspondingly, federal, state and municipality public entities and agencies integrating the 
financial system have to submit their RFC and a testimony (or a certified copy) of the 
instrument containing the powers of the legal representatives.  
 This type of information would be really useful for a tax audit, since the authority 
would have the updated and accurate information from some national or foreign economic 
agent, either an individual or a corporation.  However, customer identification is not enough to 
prevent money laundering.  In a review regarding prevention of operations with illegal origin 
resources, it is verified that financial institutions conduct deeper analysis of the background of 
their customers as it is essential to know the background, occupation and transactional pattern 
of those who try to carry out operations with outstanding amounts.  
 Firstly, it is necessary to establish that one of chief constituent of customer knowledge 
is information about the origin of the funds with which they operate.  However, this is a 
cumbersome process involving in-depth analysis of the activities carried out by customers, 
regular submission of documentation and operation monitoring.  A useful variable employed by 
financial institutions for monitoring their customer transactional behavior is “Preferential 
Product” – products that are preferred by customers to carry out their operations. Thus, when 
these preferential products are analyzed in financial institutions, abnormalities can be detected 
in the customer transactional pattern, thereby identifying unusual or suspicious operations. 
 An example of such an analysis is shown in the table below. The analysis involves 
determining what products are the most widely used by customers of a financial institution. 
This information could therefore, facilitate the detection of a potential tax payer who is in the 
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informal sector, but who has transactions amounting to thousands of dollars throughout the 
financial sector of a country.  
 Thus, this analysis of ‘preferential treatment’ can help fiscal authorities to detect tax 
evasion, since tax payers that evade paying taxes generally make financial transactions without 
informing the fiscal authority about the profit generated by them. 
 In this sense, knowing the customer entails much more than just having identification 
documents. The money laundering prevention acts compel financial institutions to record the 
origin of the funds and the characteristic of the operations of their customers. This information 
allows the fiscal authority to know if a tax payer is having making multi-million dollar 
financial transactions while their financial statements are non-existent. 
 With the possibilities of forging information and documentation in underdeveloped 
markets, customer knowledge requires transcending a simple identification, making it 
necessary to monitor customer’s transactions in order to be able to detect unusual or suspicious 
operations. This information is highly useful for tax authorities in planning or leading tax 
audits. 
For instance, some of the variables that financial institutions should analyze during the 
process of acquiring customer knowledge including considering the purchase volume per type 
of client and the sales volume per type of client. For the analysis of purchase volume per type 
of client, corporate individuals account for 45.76% of the volume, banks 27.22%, money 
exchange houses 14.61%, individuals 4.94%, brokerage houses 3.64%, foreigners 3.29% and 
the intermediaries, AE individuals making up the remaining 0.55%. Similarly, for sales volume 
per type of client, corporate individuals make up 48.07%, banks 24.71%, money exchange 
houses 15.18%, individuals 4.64%, brokerage houses 3.62%, foreigners 3.26%, with the 
intermediaries and AE individuals making up the remaining 0.51%.  
With the information obtained from Figures 2 and 3, financial institutions can determine 
what sector of what type of customers stand out due the scale of their operating volume.  This 
information would be highly useful for tax authorities, since they might be able to compare it 
against their tax databases and determine if there is connection. If no connection is established, 
tax authorities would have a reliable indicator to carry out a more accurate and thorough fiscal 
supervision. This would allow them to detect if even a tax-paying customer is reporting profits 
lower than the real amount, and thus evading the correct tax payment to the Treasury. 
 For instance, many tax payers, individuals and corporations, estimate the amount of tax 
they are going to pay as part of their fiscal planning at the beginning of the year. Consequently, 
they manipulate their accounts so that they only have to pay the ‘target’ amount of taxes.  They 
for loopholes in the Fiscal Law so that if they have higher than estimated profits, they can 
invest in increasing business assets instead of reporting an increase in business profits to the tax 
authorities.  Thus, the Federal Fiscal Audit of a country must gather financial intelligence to 
prevent tax evasion.  Nonetheless, having financial information needs to be current in order to 
effectively combat money laundering and tax evasion.  Therefore, once policies and procedures 
of customer identification and knowledge are established, it is essential that such information is 
updated periodically.  For instance, the Mexican Law regarding money laundering prevention 
requires financial institutions to update information about customers, especially when 
significant changes are detected in the usual transactional behavior or whenever authorities 
raise doubts over the authenticity of such information or documents. 
 This information can help the fiscal authorities to detect the real address of a tax payer, 
since generally; evasive tax payers (mainly corporations) use fictitious addresses to simulate 
the real field and location of business.  This is done to deceive tax regulators so that once a 
company address is not found it is deleted from the tax payers’ database.  This process is 
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facilitated by the fact that the people who verify the fiscal address who are hired by the SHCP 
are temporary employees and do not earn more than the minimum salary.  Therefore, they are 
easily bribed, as they enter false information into the SHCP databases in exchange for an 
economic remuneration.  This sets a vicious circle in motion as tax evasion becomes worse.  
When there are no strict fiscal regulations, the authorities themselves cannot trigger the 
administrative execution procedure required for a tax audit. 
 
IV.2 Operation prevention, identification, analysis and report.  
According to FATF’s 13th recommendation, if a financial institution suspects or has 
reasonable grounds to suspect that a customer’s fund are coming from a criminal activity, it 
should be required (by law or regulation) to report its suspicions promptly to the financial 
intelligence unit (FIU).  The purpose of the abovementioned regulation is to report known or 
suspected violations of law or suspicious activity observed by financial institutions.  In many 
instances, these reports have been instrumental in enabling law enforcement to initiate or 
supplement major money laundering investigations and other criminal cases.  Information 
provided in these reports also allows authorities to identify emerging trends and patterns 
associated with financial crimes.  These trends and patterns are vital to law enforcement 
agencies and provide valuable feedback to financial institutions.  The information generated 
from the suspicious or unusual activity report filings plays an important role in identifying 
potential illegal activities and assists law enforcement in detecting and preventing the flow of 
illegal funds through the financial systems. 
 In Mexico, the laws in force require that financial institutions issue reports to the 
competent authorities about the operations that could be considered as ‘relevant’ or ‘unusual’. 
Relevant must be understood as an operation carried out for an amount equal or higher than the 
equivalent in national currency of 10,000 USD (3,000 USD for exchange centers) daily per 
customer, in any of the monetary instruments specified in the law. An ‘unusual’ activity is any 
activity, behavior or conduct that does not match with the background or activity known or 
stated by the customer (and for which the customer has no reasonable justification), or with his 
usual pattern of transactional behavior, in terms of the amount, frequency, type or nature of the 
operation in question. 
 Information concentrated in the unusual or suspicious operation reports can also be 
obtained by a fiscal authority as they record relevant information about individuals or 
corporations who are carrying out operations with large amounts or transactions that are 
beyond their usual transactional pattern.  This behavior should be known by fiscal authorities in 
order to determine if tax payments correspond to the transactional activity or behavior of the 
reported subjects, thereby allowing the detection of possible tax evaders. 
 
IV.3 Record and preservation of customer information and transactions 
Financial institutions must keep necessary records about national and international 
transactions (chronological, alphabetical, etc.) with the aim of generating and auditable trace of 
the customer documentation and his transactions.  This would allow them to respond efficiently 
to the requirements from the competent judiciary or administrative authorities as it would be 
possible to rebuild a certain transaction whenever necessary.  According to the international 
and legal standards, banks and other financial institutions are required to preserve, for at least 
five years, documents accrediting the execution of operations and the identity of the people 
who may have executed them, or who may have had business relations with the institutions. 
 The Mexican legislation requires that personal information and documentation about 
customers, as well as their respective transactions, are kept for a period no shorter than 10 years 
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from the last transaction made. Information and documentation preservation periods match 
those required by fiscal authorities, thereby providing sufficient physical evidence in the case 
that it is required to start a trial against any tax payer. 
 
IV.4 Information requests by authorities 
The SHCP has the authority to require financial institutions to make modifications to 
their policies of customer identification and knowledge, and the criteria, measures and 
procedures that they have made according to what is foreseen in the Law.  The SHCP by means 
of the Corresponding Commissions and the Tax Administration Service (SAT), in the exercise 
of the supervision faculties conferred by the law, would supervise financial institutions 
(including its offices, branches, agencies, affiliates and establishment, both in the national 
territory and abroad). Under the regulations  established in the law, these institutions would be 
required to provide the SHCP with all the information or documentation necessary for 
developing its faculties at any given moment. Therefore, cases in which subjects under 
obligation submit incomplete or incorrect information (or when the electronic media do not 
comply with the specifications indicated by the SHCP), the subjects could face punishments or 
sanctions for non-compliance.  Financial institutions would also submit the following 
documents and information to the SHCP: 
 
• Official name of the financial institution 
• Owner’s name or in its case, of the main stockholders. 
• Address of their offices, establishments or branches where operations are made.  
• Name of administrators or factors.  
• Copy of the Fiscal Identification Card.  
 
This information should be updated at least once a year in the sequence determined by the 
SHCP. 
The core of this section refers to the fact that the SHCP, along with the subsidiary 
Financial Intelligence Unit (UIF) and the Tax Administration Service, and the body in charge 
of conducting fiscal reviews and audits should be able to share information about the current 
and potential tax payers.  This would allow the internal transfer of information about the 
customers of the financial institutions and the current tax payers, into the SHCP database.  
 
IV.5 Proper technological media for preventing, detecting and reporting operations 
with illegal origin resources 
One of the fundamental aspects that an effective money laundering program must have 
is that financial institutions must implement the proper technological systems that can help 
them detect operations with illegal origin resources.  The automatic procedure of the 
information that produces alert indicators or red lights is essential for money laundering 
prevention, since financial institutions may have a supporting tool that allows them to get 
information about customers and their operations, making records, filing information, 
monitoring their customers’ transactions an dmaking reports.  Currently, authorities require that 
financial institutions issue reports on the operations of those customers who carry out unusual 
or suspicious transactions, as well as of those who operate with relevant or large amounts, 
electronically.  In Mexico, financial institutions must do this through the official format or 
“layout” issued by the Mexican Financial Intelligence Unit (UIF). 
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The information in the power of the competent authorities when receiving such reports 
can be highly useful for fiscal authorities, since these reports concentrate the information of 
customers who are operating suspiciously or unusually, or who are making transactions for 
large amounts. This could be an important alert signal for fiscal authorities; as such information 
might be compared with the tax databases, with the aim of determining if, apart from that, there 
are no irregular aspects or omissions as for tax payment.  The official layout contains 
information such as: personal information of who is making the operation address, the kind of 
operation that was done, the monetary instrument used, account number, the operation date, a 
brief description of the operation, among others. 
 
IV.6 Risk Analysis of customers 
International recommendations suggest that any money laundering prevention program 
must be made based on the risk level that the institution is facing as the institutions face the 
possibility that their customers may carry out acts or operations that could assist in money 
laundering crime.  Thus, an important international recommendation is that financial 
institutions must periodically verify the lists issued by organizations such as the OFAC, CIA, 
FBI and PGR before making frequent operations and/or of significant amounts with a current or 
potential customer. This is done in order to know his background, identify risks and prevent 
making operations with people linked to criminal organizations. Moreover, in order to 
determine the risk level more accurately, it is essential to verify the list of non-cooperating 
countries and territories issued by the Financial Action Task Force (FATF) with the aim of 
identifying such customers coming from territories considered as high risks, as well as from 
those territories considered as fiscal paradises.  
The Mexican legislation, for instance, requires institutions to classify customers 
according to risk degree, high risk and low risk.  The institutions can choose to establish further 
intermediate risks levels.  It is also recommended that financial institutions make a money-
laundering potential risk matrix which includes key variables that help to profile their 
customers.  All potential and current customers must be filtered through this matrix before 
making any operation.  Such a risk level analysis of people operating through the different 
financial institutions can be really useful for fiscal authorities as it allows the authorities to 
make all the audits necessary to determine if the customers identified as high risk are paying 
the correct amount of taxes (as determined by their activity, business field, geographic location, 
and type of operations made).  Therefore, risk collections would make the detection of tax 
evaders more efficient. 
 
IV.7 Audits 
Within the GAFI recommendations, it is suggested that financial institutions develop 
programs to combat asset laundering and terrorism funding.  This would involve setting up an 
audit function to test the correct implementation of policies and procedures regarding 
prevention, detection and reporting on operations with illegal origin resources.  This type of 
audits may include a section in which fiscal aspects shall be verified, in order to determine if 
the tax payments are being made correctly. 
Auditing is one of the chief methods of detecting tax evasion.  Therefore, it is 
imperative to identify impacts that audits may have on the tax payers’ payment availability. 
Similarly, it is possible to estimate the current probability of a person, individual or 
corporation, being audited.  It is necessary that tax authorities consider the way in which audits 
are conducted.  The auditing process must be highly focused and must be accompanied with 
random reviews as this influences the tax payer’s perception of the probability of him being 
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detected.  Thus, when the probability of being audited is low, the tax payer is more likely to 
evade taxes.  On the other hand, anti-money laundering programs, through the risk analysis 
conducted by financial institutions, would be able to identify those tax payers who need to be 
audited.  Thus, it serves as an effective measure to combat tax evasion. 
 
IV.8 Frequency and amount of operations 
When reviews or audits are conducted, some of the information requested is the daily 
record of operations corresponding to a specific period as part of the program to combat money 
laundering.  These records include purchase and sales-related information, number of 
operations, transfers and profits derived from services rendered by the financial institution.  
This information can be really helpful for fiscal authorities as they can use it to determine the 
transactional pattern of a financial institution, its input and output flows and the profits for 
which they must be paying the corresponding taxes. 
 
V. Conclusion 
A country must combat money laundering, terrorism and tax evasion to facilitate 
economic growth and development.   Tax evasion may occur for several reasons: 
1. Overly confusing and complicated tax legislation.  
2. Certain territories have informal trade tendencies and, therefore, carry out most of 
their transactions in cash. This makes it easier to hide the actual trace of the number 
of transactions made and the amounts involved.  
3. Inefficient and obsolete revision and enforcement mechanisms.  
4. Lack of information regarding the taxpayer’s fiscal address and whether any given  
A high money laundering index in a territory is an indicator of the lack of appropriate 
controls set forth by the judicial authorities.  Crimes such as drug dealing, child prostitution, 
organ trafficking, corruption, fraud, piracy and bootlegging, smuggling, extortion, public fund 
diversion are committed with the intention of usufructing the revenue derived from them.  As a 
result, money laundering prevention provides a non-judicial way of combating crimes which 
affect society in general. 
Terrorism and money laundering are chiefly combated through the establishment and 
management of databases containing detailed information about persons and businesses.  These 
databases include knowing the financial management of accounts, providers and customers, as 
well as the transfers through financial enterprises.  This information is gathered by legal means 
and may be used by fiscal authorities to cross financial information with tax declaration 
databases, opening up the possibility of correctly addressing fiscal audits.  This solves 
fundamental problems such as the lack of updated and reliable information of businesses or 
persons which avoid making their federal contributions. 
 Money laundering is like water as it follows the path of least resistance.  Therefore, it is 
essential that all countries are committed to combat organized crime, financial and non-
financial, and establish effective policies to prevent money laundering. 
 Furthermore, tax audits play an important role in decreasing the incidence of tax 
evasion, as they take into consideration that if the probability of being audited is low, 
businesses are more likely to underreport their income or exaggerate their tax deductions, using 
transfer pricing methods to evade taxes. Additionally, if the probability of competent 
authorities auditing a given person or business is latent in the areas of tax evasion and money 
laundering, tax evasion indexes are bound to decrease.  Thus, every institution should be 
required to have an external auditor report specialized in money laundering prevention as the 
financial and fiscal authorities of a given country usually do not possess enough resources. 
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Moreover, due to budget constraints, the government cannot greatly increase expenditure on the 
implementation of an anti-money laundering program. 
 The report should at least include a review of the next few aspects: 
 
1. Money laundering prevention policies and procedures. 
2. Know you customer (KYC) policies.  
3. Mechanisms to send transaction reports to the authorities. 
4. Customer Risk Classification.  
5. Appropriate systems to prevent, detect, and report transactions with proceedings of 
illicit origin. 
6. Anti-money laundering training programs and their implementation. 
 
Finally, it is important that authorities promote the sharing of information between 
governmental entities as this would allow authorities to detect potential tax evaders who are not 
yet part of a taxable base but (based on the monitoring of their activities) should be declaring 
and paying the appropriate taxes.  Therefore, the more information is gathered about taxpayers 
and their transactional behavior, the more precise and effective the supervision of the taxable 
base will be. 
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Notes 
1. The benefit in having a shadow economy is illustrated in the work of Choi and Thum 
(2005) who study the mutual relationships among corruption, the shadow economy, and the 
unofficial economy.  In a model of self-selection with heterogeneous entrepreneurs, they show 
that the entrepreneurs' option to flee to the underground economy constrains a corrupt official's 
ability to introduce distortions to the economy for private gains. The unofficial economy thus 
mitigates government-induced distortions and, as a result, leads to enhanced economic 
activities in the official sector. In this sense, the presence of the unofficial sector acts as a 
complement to the official economy instead of as a substitute 
 
2. The issue of money laundering in the economics literature is quite vast.  Some web 
resources include: 
1. “Banking in Cyprus: Anti-Money Laundering Measures,” at 
http://www.centralbank.gov.cy/nqcontent.cfm?a_id=35 
2. “Cyber-payments and Money Laundering: Problems and Promise,” at 
http://www.rand.org/publications/MR/MR965/MR965.pdf/ 
3. “Drug Trafficking and Money Laundering,” at  
http://www.foreignpolicy-infocus.org/briefs/vol3/v3n16lau.html 
4. “Drug Trafficking and Money Laundering in Panama,” at 
http://www.usdoj.gov/dea/pubs/cngrtest/ct061300.htm 
5. “Fact Sheet: International Money Laundering and Asset Forfeiture,” at  
http://www.whitehousedrugpolicy.gov/publications/international/factsht/ 
6. “Financial Flows and Drug Trafficking in The Amazon Basin,” at 
http://www.unesco.org/most/ds22eng.htm 
7. “The Global Fight against Money Laundering,” at 
http://www.ustreas.gov/fincen/border.html 
8. “International Money Laundering,” at 
http://www.usdoj.gov/dea/pubs/cngrtest/ct062300.htm 
9. “Money Laundering by Drug Trafficking Organizations,” at 
http://www.usdoj.gov/dea/pubs/cngrtest/ct960228.htm 
10. “Money Laundering: A Banker's Guide to Avoiding Problems,” at 
http://www.occ.treas.gov/moneylaundering2002.pdf 
11. “On the Issue of the United States, Russia, and Money Laundering,” at  
http://www.csis.org/hill/ts990921deborch.pdf 
12. “U.S. Law Enforcement Response to Money Laundering Activities in Mexico,” at 
http://www.usdoj.gov/dea/pubs/cngrtest/ct960906.htm 
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